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With lessons learned from previous episodes as well as substantial improvements in economic policies
and fundamentals over the years emerging market economies (EMEs) on average are better positioned to
withstand ﬁnancial turbulences, both now and in the near future, than in the past. Since their respective
last ﬁnancial crises most EMEs have been implementing more prudent policies, made stronger their
governance frameworks and created ﬁnancial safety nets as a buffer against adverse shocks. As a result,
they were able to strengthen their stock and ﬂow balances and policy frameworks, deepen local capital
markets, and diversify their production and exports together with stronger global trade and ﬁnancial
linkages.1. Introduction
In recent years, the importance of emerging market economies
(EMEs) has further increased as they account for not only a much
increased share of world population but also a rising share of global
economic output and exports, and a substantial fraction of world
growth.1 Emerging market (EM) countries have also become
increasingly more connected to the global ﬁnancial system as, on
the one hand, with their strong growth prospects and higher in-
terest rates they have attracted foreign investors and, on the other
hand, they have accumulated large foreign assets as foreign ex-
change reserves. On the back of these developments the question
whether these economies with still emerging ﬁnancial markets
have sufﬁciently advanced their resiliency to external shocks has a
greater importance than in the past.
Indeed, the history shows that numerous ﬁnancial crises and
subsequent economic recessions took place in the EM world. With
the help of strong pull such as the catch-up effect and push factors
such as external shocks, on average, EMEs tend to grow at faster
rates than advance economies (AE) and are hence likely to incur
external imbalances in the form of trade and/or capital accountnç), pinar.erdem@tcmb.gov.tr
¸ ).
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B.V. on behalf of Central Bank of Tdeﬁcits. Foreign investors ﬁnance these external imbalances to the
extent that the resulting higher rates of return in EMEs are greater
than those in AEs in risk adjusted terms. The imbalances often
accumulated fast and worsened stock balances (such as govern-
ment debt to GDP and external debt to GDP ratios) too. Further-
more, strong capital inﬂows to EMEs mostly led to a strong real
appreciation of their currencies which, in turn, worsened their
current account balances further as they suffered from the loss of
competitiveness.
In the 1980s and 1990s EMEs experienced ﬁnancial crises
following a sudden reversal of capital ﬂows. In fact, during this
period there were two waves of ﬁnancial crisis in the EM world.
The ﬁrst wave was associated with currency crises as signiﬁcantly
strengthened US dollar led to massive adjustments in the ﬁxed
EM exchange rates. This followed sovereign debt crises in many
emerging markets, i.e., Mexico, Brazil and Argentina. The second
wave was triggered by sudden stop of capital inﬂows. The EM
banks having intermediated these ﬂows, as a result, caused these
severe ﬁnancial crises in several EMEs such as Mexico and Turkey
in 1994, East Asian countries after mid-1997 and Russia in 1998.
The insufﬁcient volume of external safety nets as well as the
underdeveloped nature of ﬁnancial markets in EMEs made
ﬁnancial crises unavoidable. In addition, having not able to
implement countercyclical policies EMEs suffered from larger
damaging effects of ﬁnancial crises on their real economies
otherwise.
It is noteworthy that despite the lack of capacities in avoiding
ﬁnancial crises EMEs mostly managed to recover swiftly from their
acute past ﬁnancial crises succeeding severe economic recessions.he Republic of Turkey. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
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Turkey and others. Likewise, most EMEs survived once in a century
event e global ﬁnancial crisis of 2008 (GFC) in spite of its profound
impacts on the ﬁnancial systems of AEs. The GFC exposed excessive
levels in private debts including households, nonﬁnancial com-
panies and ﬁnancial ﬁrms. The need for deleveraging of these debts
led to balance sheet recessions in AEs, also deemed as the great
recession. The unprecedented stimulus and bailout policies un-
dertaken in the aftermath of the GFC probably had somemitigating
effect on the great recession but could not prevented it. EMEs again
escaped the great recession though some of them had brief eco-
nomic recessions.
With lessons learned from previous episodes and improve-
ments over the years EMEs are, on average, better positioned to
withstand ﬁnancial turbulences, both now and in the future, than
in the past. They embarked on extensive structural reforms aimed
at overhauling ﬁnancial regulatory and supervisory systems,
strengthening public ﬁnances and ﬁscal discipline, granting cen-
tral banks independence, and adopting ﬂexible exchange rate
systems. These reforms enabled them to implement more pru-
dent and countercyclical policies. EMEs supported their post crisis
reforms by accumulating adequate foreign exchange reserves so
as to avoiding the strict conditionality features of the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) provided global ﬁnancial safety nets
as well as their insufﬁciency and by further deepening and
broadening their domestic ﬁnancial markets. As a result, stock
and ﬂow balances, policy frameworks, and levels of economic
conﬁdence and market development in EMEs have strengthened
critically and radically. It is fair to say that they now look strong
enough to render the adverse effects of external ﬁnancial shocks
manageable.
However, the current unconventional monetary policies of AEs
in the form of low or even negative nominal policy rates as well as
quantitative easing together with unintended consequences of the
ﬁnancial sector reforms across the world pose new challenges to
EMEs. Until recently because of better growth prospects and lower
levels of leveraging, EMEs attracted capital inﬂows with their non-
ﬁnancial corporates having lion shares. The normalization of
global monetary policies has reversed the course of capital ﬂows
and led to the sizable depreciation of EM currencies against the
dollar. This creates inﬂationary pressures due to the pass-through
impact and impairs balance sheets due to tightening global
ﬁnancial conditions and worsening growth prospects. Further-
more, the sharp fall in oil prices exacerbates the deterioration in
economic outlook for commodity importing countries. Going for-
ward, the normalization of the US monetary policy, diverging
monetary policies of AEs, uncertainty in commodity prices and the
risk of Chinas economic hard-landing all will likely to contribute
to volatile global ﬁnancial markets and widening spreads for
EMEs.
This paper evaluates the developments, trends and frameworks
characterizing the EM world. Section 2 describes stock and ﬂow
balances in EMEs. External shocks to EMEs are explained in Section
3. The ﬁnal section provides a brief conclusion.
2. Strong stock and ﬂow balances in EMEs
The great ﬁnancial crises of 1980s and 1990s such as the Asian,
Latin American and Turkish ﬁnancial crises decisively altered the
economic policy paradigm of the EM world. Almost in all cases the
two factorsda rapid increase in leverage and a sharp appreciation
of the currency2ecaused these ﬁnancial crises. Consequent IMF2 See Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012).stand-by programmes played the major role in this paradigm shift.
The stand-by programmes painfully required them to embark on
the so-called ﬁrst generation of structural reforms involving the
overhaul of ﬁnancial regulatory and supervisory system, strong
public ﬁnances and ﬁscal discipline, and central bank indepen-
dence. In the wake of these crises EMEs have been methodically
implementing prudent and countercyclical policies to prevent
macroeconomic and external imbalances building. Having the
institutional structures and policy frameworks in place the EMEs
have not only prevented deteriorations in stock and ﬂow balances
but also recorded strong improvements.
2.1. Stock balances
2.1.1. Public and private debt
Since EMEs mostly suffered from sovereign debt crises, ﬁscal
discipline has been the cornerstone of the ﬁrst generation of
structural reforms. Prudent ﬁscal policies have played a key role in
maintaining low budget deﬁcits and hence lowered debt levels to
the extent that budgets delivered primary surpluses (Fig. 1). Lower
interest rates implied by improved ﬁnancial needs of the govern-
ment sector then further reinforced ﬁscal positions. As a conse-
quence, the share of government bonds in emerging debt markets
has declined and created room for the private sector debt market to
grow (Fig. 2). Private debt levels in EMEs have also stayed at
moderate levels on average (Fig. 3). This feature basically creates
two advantages. The ﬁrst is related to the fact that lower indebt-
edness levels are associated with lower degrees of debt overhang
problem and hence makes adverse effects of negative shocks more
manageable than otherwise. Second, low levels of debt indicate
that there is room for creation of healthy loans that will support
growth and economic development.
2.1.2. External debt
Declined public debt also implied lower bases for external debt.
In additions to this development, EM governments have
consciously borrowed less in foreign currencies in the wake of their
earlier ﬁnancial crises. Combined effects have, on average, reduced
government owned external debt to GDP ratio from 35 percent at
the beginning of the 2000s to 25 percent in 2013 (Fig. 4). This
decline in eurodollar loans manifests deepened domestic debt
markets and hence have reduced the so called “original sin”
problem of EMEs to the extent that foreign investors willing to lend
in domestic currency as opposed to hard currencies. Hausmann and
Panizza (2003, 2011) argue that one of the factors that created
economic instability in EMEs is the original sin problem. According
to this hypothesis emerging and developing countries are unable toFig. 1. EM gross government debt.
Fig. 2. Shares of sectors in domestic bond markets in EMEs.
Fig. 3. Private credits in EMEs.
Fig. 4. External public debt of EMEs.
Fig. 5. The original sin.
Fig. 6. Laverage ratio (bank capital to assets).
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portfolio diversiﬁcation at the global level to emerging currency
denominated investments. Needless to say, borrowing in foreign
currencies creates currency mismatch problemeincreases in the
cost of debt-servicing foreign currency denominated external ob-
ligations in cases of real exchange rate depreciation. The cost is
measured in terms of the reduced purchasing power of domestic
output over foreign claims following the depreciation. We update
the original sin indicator of Hausmann and Panizza (2003) and
report new results in Fig. 5. Although the indicator has been
increasing since the beginning of 2012 it is much below the level ofthe 1990s. In other words, EMEs share of obligations in foreign
currencies are well below those observed in the 1990s.
2.1.3. Bank capital
Bailing out banks during the above mentioned EM ﬁnancial
crises put heavy burden on government budgets of EMEs. It was
well-understood that banking sector plays a systemic role. In order
to avoid bailout costs and disturbances to the intermediation of
loans to real economy EMEs overhauled their banking sector reg-
ulatory and supervisory systems. These reforms tried to ensure that
their banks hold adequate capitals to be resilient to shocks and, in
general, run their businesses in a prudent way. Fig. 6 shows that
leverage ratios measured as (risk unweighted) capital divided by
total assets, on average, stayed above the average level of the 1980's
and 1990's and also the average ratio of advanced economy banks.
2.2. Flow balances
After evaluating the key stock balances we nowmove to ﬂow bal-
ancestorevealthedynamicsgoverningstockbalances intheeconomy.
They includeeconomicgrowth, inﬂationandcurrent accountbalance.
2.2.1. Growth
Fig. 7 shows that average GDP growth rates of EMEs are still above
that of AEs and EMEs still contribute to global growth signiﬁcantly
despite the latest synchronous and protracted slowdown in EMEs.
2.2.2. Inﬂation
Fig. 8 reveals that the probably biggest post-crises’ success of
EMEs is in the area of price stability. Prudent macroeconomic and
Fig. 7. GDP growth rates of EMEs and AEs.
Fig. 8. Annual inﬂation of EMEs.
Fig. 9. Current account balances.
Fig. 10. Capital ﬂows to EMEs.
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are the key factors behind this much lower inﬂation outcome.
Among them the granting of independence to many EM central
banks has been the most signiﬁcant progress in improving the
institutional quality of EM intuitions. Their successes in lowering
inﬂation over the years have resulted in desirable gains inmonetary
policy credibility. The adoptation of inﬂation targeting frameworks
provided beneﬁcial nominal anchors and further enhanced policy
credibility. To the extent that prudent policies and frameworks
succeeded in achieving their targets the key dominances, especially
ﬁscal dominance, have eased and thereby signiﬁcantly increased
the effectiveness of monetary policy.2.2.3. Current account balance
One of the chief causes of the GFC is the existence of global
external imbalances (Fig. 9). The G20 led policy coordination has
reduced the imbalance to a certain degree. In the process, some
EMEs suffered from declines in their surplus levels but the others
succeeded improvements.3. How resilient are EMEs to global ﬁnancial conditions?
In this section we assess EMEs' resilience to external shocks by
discussing the ways and extents of external shocks are transmitted
to domestic economies of EMEs3 discuss the effects and3 Lane (2003), Mackowiak (2007).transmission channels of external shocks on EMEs in detail. The
ﬁrst transmission way of external shocks is the trade channel. In
recent decades EMEs have increased their share of global exports
and recorded strong growth in inter-regional and intra-regional
trade among EMEs which makes up around one-ﬁfth of the
worlds total trade. In addition, they have diversiﬁed their produc-
tion and exports.4 Although EMEs' increased trade openness
magniﬁes the impact of external shocks on EMEs, strengthened
product and regional diversity dampen the impact. Similar argu-
ments can be made for the second transmission channelefunding
channel: increased external liabilities but well diversiﬁed sources
together with signiﬁcantly lengthened maturities. But there is a
negative development worth mentioning that capital ﬂows are
mostly driven by the unconventional policies of major central
banks (Fig. 10) and have become volatile (Fig. 11) since the GFC.
Finally, the aforementioned improvements in EMEs are likely to
constrain the deterioration in business and consumer expectations.
This is also a signiﬁcant development as the lessons learned from
the past ﬁnancial turmoils and crises revealed that the most dis-
tinguishing feature of an emerging market economy is their sig-
niﬁcant deterioration effects on the real economy through the
expectations channel. Among many advances in EMEs, rich policy
frameworks have played an important role in improving economic
agents' conﬁdence in EM economies. In addition, EMEs' ability and
policy to accumulate policy spaces have made signiﬁcant4 Didier et al. (2015).
Fig. 11. Portfolio ﬂows to EMEs.
Fig. 13. Average business conﬁdence level of EMEs.
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that in addition to conventional macroeconomic policies EMEs have
also extensively usedmacro- andmicro-prudential policies, serving
as buffers for shocks (Fig. 12). In during the EM crises EMEs adopted
a number of macro-prudential measures when conventional pol-
icies, such as rate hikes tomanage aggregate demand, were realized
to be ineffective and/or insufﬁcient. Such macro-prudential tools
have not only maintained low levels of leverage but also accumu-
lated buffers that can serve as policy spaces in cases of economic
downturn, as in EMEs ﬁscal policies. Additionally, macro-
prudential policy helped monetary authorities implement mone-
tary policy exclusively to achieve price stability. Finally, EMEs
learned macro-prudential policy is more appropriate to limit and
repair maturity and currency mismatch problems. In addition to
the macro-prudential policy, EMEs learned to rigorously imple-
ment micro-prudential policies in order to make their ﬁnancial
ﬁrms, especially banks, more resilient and safer against ﬁnancial
stresses. The macro and micro prudential policies of EMEs in the
previous decades have succeeded in lowering levels of leverage, not
only in ﬁnancial sectors, but also in non-ﬁnancial and household
sectors. This, in turn, lowered levels of maturity and currency
mismatches. This created banking sectors in many EMEs that had
high capital adequacy ratios and low non-performing loan ratios.
Moreover, in relative terms ﬁscal positions of EMEs have
strengthened even further as those of AEs have worsened in the
aftermath of the global ﬁnancial crisis due to sizeable ﬁscal stim-
ulus policies. Keeping this systemically important sector free from
solvency risk has helped EMEs gain business conﬁdence (Fig. 13).Fig. 12. Average number macroprudentail policies implemented by EMEs.Lower deﬁcit and debt levels imply ample policy spaces for EMEs in
cases of economic downturn. Creditworthiness together with pol-
icy spaces on the EM ﬁscal fronts have contained upward pressures
on interest rates and have kept the effectiveness of other policies
intact.
4. Conclusion
In this paper we covered the key developments, trends, frame-
works and balances in EMEs in the aftermath of their ﬁnancial
crises to answer the question whether they are now more resilient
to external shocks or not. As a result of their reforms and prudent
policies EMEs have signiﬁcantly improved their stock and ﬂow
balances, and are now more diversiﬁed economies. Furthermore,
they have accumulated substantial amounts of foreign exchange
reserves and enjoyed signiﬁcant improvements in policy effec-
tiveness. The resulting ample policy spaces and buffers and
improved conﬁdence together with greater exchange rate ﬂexi-
bility have graduated EMEs to conducting countercyclical monetary
policy. Finally, the developments, frameworks, balances and buffers
covered in this paper will again be very useful for EMEs in with-
standing the current ﬁnancial turbulences stemming from the
normalization of global monetary policies, the transition of some
key EMEs to new economies and the terms of trade shocks.
Appendix. Data
Gross Government Debt: It is obtained from IMF World Eco-
nomic Outlook (WEO) database as a share of GDP. It consists of all
liabilities that require payment or payments of interest and/or
principal by the debtor to the creditor at a date or dates in the
future.
Shares of Sectors in Domestic Bond Markets: Shares of sectors
in domestic bond markets in developing countries are obtained
from BIS Debt Securities Statistics. Sample of countries includes
Argentina, Brazil, China, Chile, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel,
South Korea, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, Thailand and Turkey.
Domestic debt securities by sectors statistics are used and the
average shares of countries are reported.
Private Credits: It is collected from the World Banks World
Development Indicators (WDI) Database. Domestic credit to private
sector refers to ﬁnancial resources provided to the private sector by
ﬁnancial corporations, such as through loans, purchases of non-
equity securities, and trade credits and other accounts receivable,
that establish a claim for repayment. The ﬁnancial corporations
include monetary authorities and deposit money banks, as well as
other ﬁnancial corporations where data are available.
T. Kenç et al. / Central Bank Review 16 (2016) 1e66External Debt: External Debt data is obtained from the IMF's
WEO Database as a percentage of GDP. It reﬂects total external debt
(all short and long-term debt).
Bank Capital to Assets Ratio: Bank capital to assets ratio is
collected from the WDI database. It is the ratio of bank capital and
reserves to total assets. Capital and reserves include funds
contributed by owners, retained earnings, general and special re-
serves, provisions, and valuation adjustments. Capital includes tier
1 capital, and total regulatory capital, which comprise tier 2 and tier
3 capital. Total assets include all non-ﬁnancial and ﬁnancial assets.
GDP Growth, Inﬂation and Current Account Balances: GDP
growth, Inﬂation and Current Account Balances are obtained from
IMF WEO Database. Current account balances are reported as a
share of total GDP. Sample of oil exporters include Algeria, Angola,
Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bolivia, Brunei Darussalam, Chad, Republic of
Congo, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Iran, Kazakhstan,
Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia,
Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan, United Arab
Emirates, Venezuela, Yemen. Sample of EMA includes Hong Kong,
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan Province
of China, Thailand. European economies (excluding Germany) are
sorted in to surplus and deﬁcit each year by signs of their current
account balances. Other G20 countries are Argentina, Australia,
Brazil, India, Mexico, South Africa and Turkey.
Capital Flows: Capital ﬂows to EMEs are obtained from IIF in
billion US Dollars in annual base. 3-month moving averages are
constructed for portfolio and bond ﬂows by using EPFR database.
Original Sin: To calculate the original sin indicator we follow
Hausmann and Panizza (2003). Required data is collected from BIS
Debt Securities Statistics. As Hausmann and Panizza (2003)
mentioned, this measure captures the possibility of hedging ex-
change rate risk and it provides aggregate measure of currency
mismatch.
Original Sin ¼ maxð1 ðsecurities issued in currency iÞ=
ðsecurities issued by country iÞ;0Þ
Selected countries are Argentina, Brazil, China, Chile, Colombia,
Czech Republic, Hungary, Hong Kong India, Indonesia, Israel, S.Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, Poland, Russia, S. Africa,
Singapore, Thailand and Turkey.
Average Business Conﬁdence Level: Average business conﬁ-
dence level is the average of standardized values of business con-
ﬁdence indices. Selected countries are Brazil, Chile, China Colombia,
Czech Republic, Hungary, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, Poland, S.
Africa, Singapore, Russia, and Turkey.
Macroprudential Policies: We use the data set of Cerutti et al.
(2015). Macroprudential index covers several instruments: Gen-
eral Countercyclical Capital Buffer/Requirement (CTC); Leverage
Ratio for banks (LEV); Time-Varying/Dynamic Loan-Loss Provi-
sioning (DP); Loan-to-Value Ratio (LTV); Debt-to-Income Ratio
(DTI); Limits on Domestic Currency Loans (CG); Limits on Foreign
Currency Loans (FC); Reserve Requirement Ratios (RR); and Levy/
Tax on Financial Institutions (TAX); Capital Surcharges on SIFIs
(SIFI); Limits on Interbank Exposures (INTER); and Concentration
Limits (CONC).
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